Financial markets in contemporary regulatory settings require the presence of high-frequency liquidity providers. We present an applied study of the profitability and the impact on market quality of an individual high-frequency trader acting as a market-maker. Using a sample of sixty stocks over a six-month period, we implement the optimal quoting policy (OQP) of liquidity provision from Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) dynamic inventory management model. The OQP allows the high-frequency trader to extract a constant annuity from the market but its profitability is insufficient to cover the costs of market-making activities. The OQP is embedded in a trading strategy that relaxes the model's constraint on the quantity traded. Circuit-breakers are implemented and market imperfections are considered. Profits excluding maker-fees and considering transaction fees are economically significant. We propose a methodology to adjust the returns for asynchronous trading and varying leverage levels associated with dynamic inventory management. This allows us to qualify high trade volume as a proxy of informed trading. The high-frequency trader behaves as a constant liquidity provider and has a positive effect on market quality even in periods of market stress.
Introduction
Most stock exchanges have removed or have diluted the formal obligation to maintain an orderly market once imposed on human market-makers: high-frequency liquidity suppliers are major participants in electronic markets (Anand and Venkataraman (2013) ; Menkveld (2013) ). Jones (2013) explains the increase in high-frequency market making by lower cost structures and more adequate responses to adverse selection.
Notwithstanding the importance of high-frequency market-making, very little is known about the profitability and individual behavior of high-frequency liquidity providers. Menkveld (2013) describes and evaluates the activities of a large high-frequency market maker (HFMM) who uses spatial arbitrage as the core of his market-making strategy. He asserts that fees are a substantial part of the HFMM's profit and loss account. Serbera and Paumard (2016) argue that maker-fees represent the core profitability of high-frequency market-making. Popper (2012) states that profits in American stocks from high-speed trading in 2012 are down 74 percent from the peak of $4.9 billion in 2009. This can be linked to a decrease in commission and rebates, reported by Malinova and Park (2015) .
To deal with this trend, we assess the economic viability, excluding maker fees, of a typical HFMM in two steps: first, we emulate the behavior of an HFMM using Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) dynamic inventory management model (the model hereafter). Their model mimics the high frequency trading stylized facts. Their setup differs from the classical dynamic inventory models (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ; Roll (1984) ; Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ; Kyle (1985) ) in that the strategic variable is whether or not to quote rather than change the supply curve. It yields to an optimal quoting policy (OQP) of liquidity provision that drives the HFMM's trading decisions.
Second, we embed the OQP in a trading strategy that relaxes some of the model's assumptions and adds risk management features.
Market-making implies asynchronous trades and varying market risk related to the dynamic leverage from the model's OQP and the liquidity demanders' needs. These factors affect the HFMM's trading performance. We propose a measure, the time-volume weighted average return (TVWAR), to cope with both phenomena. It allows us to analyze a single stock performance incurring different phases of trading activities and/or liquidity depth, and to compare returns of stocks with different idiosyncratic characteristics.
The emulation provides insights into the implications of high-frequency market-making on market quality, a matter that has raised much concern. Duffie (2010) describes the importance of monitoring the pattern of response to supply and demand shocks for asset pricing dynamics. Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2013) develop a model based on an endogenous reaction time to trading activities, and find that algorithmic trading plays an important role in monitoring the state of liquidity cycles. Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015) and Pagnotta and Philippon (2015) analyze competition on speed. They argue that competition should have a positive effect on the price discovery process. Finally, market stability is documented using Johnson et al. (2013) ultrafast extreme events (UEEs).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamic inventory management model of Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) and its optimal quoting policy. Section 3 introduces the empirical investigation. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 proposes a measure to determine the returns in a context of asynchronous data and dynamic inventory management. Section 6 sets out and discusses the results. Section 7 presents robustness tests, and Section 8 concludes the paper. Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) refer to two types of agents: low-frequency traders (LFTs), who use market orders only, and a sole HFMM who has exclusive access to the limit order book (LOB).
Optimal Quoting Policy of Liquidity Provision
The HFMM trades limit orders (LOs) only, and exhibits inventory aversion. The bid-ask spread is exogenous. This setup differs from the classical dynamic inventory models in that the strategic variable is whether or not to quote and not to change the HFMM's supply curve. The HFMM's revenue depends on the trade-off between the inflows from the bid-ask spread and the outflows from the inventory cost as depicted in the following equation: 
where:
( ): Quoting policy expected reward. : Bid-ask spread. : Constant discount factor > 0. ( ): Sell (buy) market order by LFTs at time t. : Indicator function. : HFMM bid limit order. : HFMM ask limit order. The first term to the right of equation (1) is the discounted value of the HFMM's revenue ( 2 ) earned when an incoming LFT's sell market order hits the HFMM's limit order while he is bidding ( ( = 1)). The second term is the discounted revenue associated with an incoming LFT's bid market order, and the third term is the discounted value of the HFMM's inventory costs over the period . To keep the model tractable, the HFMM always places his LOs at the best bid and/or ask price and does not issue orders larger than one contract.
Apart from observing the arrival of market orders, the HFMM receives a signal about the likely side of the next incoming market order: ∈ {1, −1}, where 1 predicts an incoming LFT's buy market order and -1 an incoming LFT's sell market order. quantifies the informational quality of the HFMM's signal. It varies from 0.5 (no prior knowledge about the side of the next incoming LFT's market order) to 1.0 (perfect knowledge). In Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) setup, the next event is either 1: the arrival of a signal with probability ( 2 ⁄ + ), μ being the arrival rate of a Poisson distribution of the HFMM's signals and λ the arrival rate of a Poisson distribution of the incoming LFTs' market orders; 2: the arrival of a market order in the direction of the last signal with probability + ; or 3: the arrival of a market order in the opposite direction of the last signal with
. The value of market-making activities for any given event assuming an inventory position of ( ∈ {⋯ , −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, ⋯ }) and a sell signal (-1) is:
Equation ( Solving equation (2) by backward induction using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Belman optimality method leads to the optimization of the expected reward trade-off.
OQP determination
Theorem 1 of Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) states that there is an optimal quoting policy of liquidity provision, based on the expected reward trade-off:
Theorem 1: The optimal quoting policy of the HFMM consists in quoting at the best bid and the best ask according to a threshold policy, i.e., there exists * < 0 < * ≤ | * | , such that:
Theorem 1 can be interpreted as follows: Suppose the HFMM receives a "buy" signal ( = 1)
while being long ( > 1). He is going to act upon it ( = 1) as long as his current inventory is not already too high ( < * ). If ( ≥ * ), the HFMM will not quote because this could increase his long inventory position beyond the optimal threshold * . Symmetrically, if the HFMM receives a "sell" signal ( = −1), he will quote on the ask side ( = 1) as long as his inventory position is not already too short ( > − * ).
An algorithm proposed by Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) presented in the Appendix allows us to determine the thresholds based on the expected reward trade-off and Theorem 1.
Emulation and OQP
To determine an optimal quoting policy of liquidity provision, the model requires six parameters:
, , , , , . All financial instruments use the same and constant parameters , the discount rate, and , the coefficient of inventory aversion.
The four remaining parameters depend on the idiosyncratic behaviors of the stocks. is the observed bid-ask spread and λ, the observed arrival rate of marketable orders. We define , the HFMM's arrival rate of signals, as the number of creations, updates, and cancellations at the LOB level 1. We constrain the HFMM to react to other market participants' actions. He does not use any private information to modify the observed price discovery process and/or the bid-ask spread.
The parameter is fixed at 0.50.
For any given combination of the six input parameters, we obtain an ex-ante OQP of liquidity provision based on the algorithm described in the Appendix. The algorithm stipulates the sides (bid and/or ask) and respective quantities to quote, i.e. the thresholds.
Empirical investigation
We aim to provide an empirical investigation of the profitability and the impact on market quality of an individual high-frequency trader acting as a liquidity provider. The decision to quote or to trade, the timing and the management of positions are totally driven by our fully automated algorithm. Our approach is fundamentally different from the traditional trading strategy approaches such as Fibonacci ratios, golden ratio, oscillators and pivot point strategies that try to forecast the future value of a financial instrument. Our method involves using the optimal quoting policy from Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) as a kernel. The OQP is independent from the market states and does not require any prediction of prices.
Data mining and data snooping have been analyzed extensively (Wasserstein and Lazar (2016) , Bailey et al. (2015) , Kim and Ji (2015) , and Bailey et al. (2014) ). Multiple-testing increases the probability of a false discovery drastically because it takes on average as few as 1 ⁄ independent iterations to produce a false discovery (Lopez De Prado (2015) ). Our results are obtained following a single set of parameter values designed ex-ante and therefore do not imply any data mining or data snooping.
First, we assess the performance of the optimal quoting policy from Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) . However, we impose the closing of all positions by issuing market orders at the end of the day (EOD); the procedure is launched at the beginning of the last three minutes of trading. The appraisal thus represents the results of "pure" market-making as accurately as possible.
Second, we embed the OQP in a trading strategy that considers market imperfections: limit orders are not uniquely identified in our database. Usually we cannot know with certainty who holds time priority. We apply the worst-case scenario to the HFMM: time priority is given to the total quantity available at the best bid (ask), excluding the HFMM limit order, one microsecond (μS) before the arrival of a market order. In this way, we depart from Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) , who assume that the HFMM is the fastest trader.
In practice, trading firms monitor market conditions and integrate pauses in their algorithms (Kelejian and Mukerji (2016) Chordia et al. (2013) , who note that market-makers are also liquidity takers in their regular activities.
Within the model of Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) , the quantity of each order is fixed at one lot.
To relax the constraint imposed on profits, we generalize this concept by defining κ, a constant quantity. κ is similar in nature to the trading unit of an option contract, e.g. 100 stocks, and is defined as the maximum quantity from the five most frequently traded quantities of a given stock.
The fragmentation of orders is a well-established concept (Almgren and Chriss (2001) ; Almgren Choosing κ with the suggested methodology reflects the fact that market participants want to mitigate their impact on the price discovery process. This is supported by the statistics of Table 2 , which demonstrate that 47.6% (41.2%) of all trades in the DAX (MDAX) do not consume the available quantity at level one.
Trading a quantity larger than 1 could cause a price impact if the available quantity at level one is insufficient to liquidate the HFMM's position. This would force the HFMM to walk into the limit order book. Empirical investigations of trading strategies are vulnerable to biases if they exhibit price impacts. This could be an indication of an undue influence on the price discovery process and it could lead real-time trading results to differ significantly from expectations. To avoid HFMM's market orders and the implied illiquidity cost transfer to other market participants that affect prices, the HFMM incurs market risk instead of walking up (down) the LOB. The HFMM trades up to the available quantity at level one and waits for the next incoming limit order(s) at that level in order to fully liquidate his position if necessary. This amounts to controlling for the instantaneous price impact (Cont, Kukanov, and Stoikov (2014) ; Bouchaud, Farmer, and Lillo (2009)). Estimating the permanent impact of market orders (Hautsch and Huang (2012) ; Huh (2014); Zhou (2012)) becomes unnecessary. We apply to κ the OQP thresholds associated with the contemporary model's parameters. In case of partial execution of a limit order, we cancel the order(s) and submit a new order(s) with the required adjusted quantity(ies). Time priority is amended accordingly.
Speed is important to gain time priority and to avoid being picked up (sniped) while displaying stale quotes, so we take into consideration the effect of latency on the trading results. We use the latency of 150 μS. This value is representative of the time required by our infrastructure and our algorithm to receive, analyze, react to, and send new orders following the arrival of new information. We can compete on speed with the other co-location firms, and we are significantly faster than buy-side investors.
Data
The data come from Xetra, the fully electronic trading platform of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
The raw dataset contains all events (deltas and snapshots) sent through the Enhanced Broadcast System, a data feed used by high-frequency traders. Deltas track all possible events in the LOB whereas snapshots convey information about the state of a given LOB at a specific time. Xetra
Parser, developed by Bilodeau (2013) , is used to reconstruct the real-time order book sequence using Xetra protocol and Enhanced Broadcast. Liquidity is provided by market participants posting limit orders in the LOB. The stocks of our sample have LOB with twenty levels on both sides of the market. The state of the LOB and the arrival of marketable orders (the trades) can be observed by the subscribers to the data feed. Time stamps are in μS, trading is anonymous and specific order identification is nonexistent. -
---------insert ----------Figure 1 DAX daily quotes -February to July 2013
----------here ---------- Table 1 presents the summary statistics from trading and LOB level one quoting activities. In Panel A, the DAX largely dominates the MDAX with a market value traded of €398.5b (92.57% of total activities) and 17.6 m of transactions (79.47%). Panel B exhibits even stronger statistics for the DAX. Quoting based exclusively on level one activity overwhelms trading as depicted by the ratio of the number of updates to the number of trades (# UTDs/# trades) that is higher than 10 for both indexes. This ratio is followed by the SEC (MIDAS, Security and Exchange Commission at http://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/midas.html) to monitor high-frequency trading activities. Table 1 Market summary statistics, trades and LOB1 Table 2 illustrates the price discovery process. Price impact minimization is the dominant trading phenomenon, with 47.6% (DAX) and 41.2% (MDAX) of all trades executed at the last tick price.
This includes combinations (0,0), (+,0), and (-,0). Aggressive orders (+,+ and -,-) induce positive autocorrelations in the price discovery process. They represent 14.3% (DAX) and 18.4% (MDAX) of all price moves, less than bid-ask bounce trades (+,-and -,+), which are respectively 18.1%
(DAX) and 21.0% (MDAX). Table 3 exhibits the two-way classification for the thirty stocks from the DAX index. The directional trading maxima (+,+ and -,-) are respectively 10.72% and 11.04% for the unique identifier (isix) 1634, and the other aggregated results are representative of all stocks. Table 3 Two-way classification of price movements in consecutive intraday trades DAX (%)
Results for the thirty stocks from the MDAX are not qualitatively different. They are not presented due to space considerations, but are available upon request. Johnson et al. (2013) proposed the concept of ultrafast extreme events (UEEs). UEEs can shed light on the price discovery process and the instabilities of financial markets, and help one appraise the HFMM's risk exposure, and stress-test trading algorithms. We define UEEs as an occurrence of a stock price ticking down (up) at least five times before ticking up (down), having a price change of at least 0.5% within a duration of 1500 milliseconds. We can interpret UEEs as surges for up ticks and mini crashes for down ticks. As depicted in Table 4 , three hundred and thirty-nine UEEs have been observed (85 in the DAX and 254 in the MDAX) during the 125 trading days of our sample (2.7 events on average per day). The number of events is significantly higher in the MDAX. This is consistent with the differences in liquidity and trading interest exhibited in Table   2 . The difference in trading intensity between the DAX and the MDAX is also reflected in the higher average repetitions (7.918 vs 6.519). Table 4 Ultrafast extreme events (UEEs) summary - -
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Figure 3 Number of UEEs per minute: DAX -MDAX ----------here ----------
The assumption of independent arrivals of HFMM signals and LFTs market orders is implicit in the Poisson distributions used by Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014). The HFMM decision follows the arrival of new information (LFTs marketable orders or signals), so we test the independence assumption on the aggregated information. Table 5 shows that one cannot reject this assumption for any stock in our sample. Table 5 Signal and trade independence: chi-square tests
----------insert ----------
----------here ----------
TVWAR: a time-and volume-weighted average return
Data emulation replicates the stock behavior. The model adapts the OQP dynamically to the stock's states by tracking the parameters λ (the arrival rate of LFTs' market orders), μ (the arrival rate of HFMM's signals), and (the bid-ask spread). This induces dynamic management of positions. To evaluate the HFMM's performance, we propose a measure based on realized PnL, which considers the impacts of leverage and asynchronous data. Both factors affect the holding period and the discrete time returns.
Equations (3) to (6) define the variables required to determine the holding period return of a sequence of events. A profit (loss) is realized when an existing position (long or short) is unwound. The unwinding quantity comes from two sources: the HFMM's marketable orders due to risk management features and incoming market orders executed against the HFMM's LOs. The unwinding quantity refers to a traded quantity that partially or totally offsets a position.
The unwinding quantity is:
: unwinding quantity for event e, negative (positive) for buys (sells). : quantity long, short or flat for event e. : event number (an event = a trade).
Maximum leverage ensues from two factors: the OQP, which depends on the parameters (Γ, D, λ, μ, C, P) of Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) and κ, the reference quantity defined in Section 3.
Effective leverage, with an upper bound equal to the maximum leverage, is influenced by speed (latency, time priority, and market-making competition), HFMM LOs, and incoming market orders (quantity and serial correlation).
The effective leverage value is:
where is based on the required capital to trade κ shares considering standard margin
requirements. An unwinding trade for the HFMM resulting in a partial execution of the reference quantity κ has a leverage value smaller than the leverage value of an unwinding trade that closes the HFMM position of 2κ. 2κ is possible when the OQP threshold is 2 and the HFMM carries the maximum inventory.
The holding period return of event is:
where is the trade price for event e.
Returns are directly impacted by the relative importance of the unwinding trades. All else being equal, there is a linear relationship between the leverage measure and the holding period return of an event.
The cumulated return over events is:
Asynchronous events are the norm in microsecond trading environments. Significant differences exist in stocks' behavior due to their liquidity and depth, and to the trading interest. To facilitate comparison, we use discrete time intervals where the returns are time-weighted and volumeweighted within the interval. Equations (7) to (14) define the variables required to determine the discrete time return over time intervals.
If a position overlaps two or more time intervals, the return is evenly spread out over the holding period. The number of time intervals in a trading day is equal to:
: time stamp of the end of the day in μS. : time stamp of the beginning of the day in μS. : number of μS in a one-time interval.
The reference time stamp at the beginning of period is given by:
The reference time stamp at the end of period equals:
The reference time stamp at the beginning of period for event e solves:
, : time stamp of event in time interval .
The reference time stamp of period d for event e is bounded by the end of the time interval d, so the reference time stamp at the end of period for event e is:
Our procedure allows us to consider both the leverage ( 
The return for time interval is the sum of the time-and volume-weighted returns of the E events of period d:
The cumulated return over time intervals adjusted for leverage and holding periods equals:
Results
We emulate the trading and quoting activities of an HFMM under two scenarios: Section 6.1 implements the OQP designed by Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) Figure 4 displays the aggregated cumulative Profit and loss from the quoting and trading activities based on Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) dynamic inventory model. Both indexes exhibit an upward trend over the entire period without significant drawdowns. The OQP allows the HFMM to extract a constant annuity from both indexes.
Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014)

----------insert ----------Figure 4 DAX -MDAX Cumulative P&L: OQP ----------here ----------
Daily and intraday statistics are presented in Table 6 . Total profits for the six-month period are 3,412 € (2,999 €) in the DAX (MDAX). Total profits are 14.8% higher in the DAX than in the MDAX. This is the result of a higher number of trades, 181,594 vs 86,199 for the DAX vs. the MDAX combined with a tiny average profit per trade of 0.019 € vs 0.034 €. This is characteristic of high-frequency trading (Jones (2013) ). Total profits are insufficient to maintain the infrastructure costs required by market-making activities. Table 6 Daily and intraday profitability -OQP ----------here ----------
---------insert ----------
Trading strategy
The dynamic management of the OQP thresholds coupled with the use of κ based on the idiosyncratic characteristics of the stocks expose the HFMM's LOs to partial executions. Table 7 illustrates the way partial execution of the HFMM's limit orders against marketable orders are handled. The example comes from the emulation of Deutsche Bank data from February 1, 2013.
It illustrates the way partial executions of the HFMM's limit orders against marketable orders are handled. It works as follow: One μS before ….054552, the HFMM is short 500 shares. At ….054552, a bid limit order creation for 1,000 shares at 42.910 is sent to the Exchange. We identify this order with the internal id 41. Internal ids refer to emulated orders from the trading strategy. At ….139361, an incoming market order hits the HFMM bid for a quantity of 169 (internal id 7).
----------insert ----------Table 7 Orders and positions: an example ----------here ----------
The HFMM position is short 331 shares. This trade is immediately followed by the cancellation of the LO with id 41, a creation (id 42) of a bid LO at 42.910 for 831 shares and a creation of an ask LO at 42.950 for 169 shares. Considering the HFMM's position (short 331) and his LO quantity of 831 (169) on the bid (ask), a full execution of one of his LOs will lead to the HFMM's κ of 500 shares for Deutsche Bank. This quantity is the maximum of the five most traded quantities of Deutsche Bank as defined in Section 3.
The profitability of the strategy is displayed in Table 8 . Panel A indicates that total profits are strongly positive. The average daily profits are economically significant, the standard deviations low, and no daily loss has occurred over the 125-day period even if the sample includes different kinds of market moods, including some high stress periods (See Figure 1 DAX daily quotesFebruary to July 2013). Table 8 HFMM acting as a designated sponsor and using the strategy has his transaction fees waived because he fulfills the Deutsche Boerse (2015) requirements.
----------insert ----------
----------insert ----------Table 9 HFMM's Trade origins ----------here ----------
Looking at Traditionally, informed traders are associated with high-volume transactions: Blume, Easley, and O'Hara (1994) show that volume provides information on information quality. Wang (1994) To investigate the impact of informed traders on HFMM's performance in this context, we compare the returns using a constant leverage to the discrete time returns adjusted for leverage and asynchronous trades using Equations (7) to (14). If large trades convey private information, the HFMM's performance adjusted for leverage should decline to reflect the permanent impact on fundamental value of the private information. The results in Table 10 mitigate this conclusion. In the DAX, the cumulated leveraged return is 99.9% higher than the cumulated constant return. This can be the result of mixed strategies using market and limit orders described by Easley, de Prado, and O'Hara (2016) . This casts doubts on the quality of information obtained from trade volume alone. A contrario, the difference between the leveraged and constant return is -19.5% in the MDAX. The trade-off between market risk and liquidity risk in this segment could explain this phenomenon. Table 10 Impact -
----------insert ----------
---------insert ----------Figure 5 DAX-MDAX Leveraged return per time interval ----------here ----------
The HFMM is a liquidity provider when he behaves as a market maker and issues market orders (consumes liquidity) for risk management purposes. Table 9 - Table 11 Participation in trades ----------here ----------As depicted in Table 11 , the HFMM would have had a positive impact on the market. He has traded €17.7b of market value, more than 90% of which comes from limit orders.
---------insert ----------
Robustness tests
Speed's impact on performance
Latency, the required time to receive, process, and react to new information, is considered crucial to the HFMM. Short latencies allow to limit being sniped on stale quotes, to aggregate new information rapidly and to gain access to market orders via time priority. Testing the effect of latency on performance is equivalent to quantify the impact of investments in technological infrastructures and softwares. It can serve as benchmark either to compare traders which differ solely by their speed or for capital budgeting decisions.
The treatment time of new information by the HFMM's strategy is 104 μS. The lower bound of the latencies analyzed is 150 μS to allow for order transmissions to the Exchange. We consider that the reference HFMM is using colocation facilities. To test for the impact of latency on the stragegy, we use latencies of 150, 500, 1 500, 5 000, and 10 000 μS. For the sixty stocks over the six-month period, we emulate real-time trading to obtain all limit and market orders. We calculate intraday and daily PnL. Finally, we aggregate the statistics by index. Results are presented in Table   12 .
----------insert ---------- Table 12 Impact of Latency on Performance
For the DAX, decreasing latency does not influence the relative risk:
( )⁄ is constant throughout all level of latencies. The investment in colocation services is fully justified by the augmentation of € 342 000 in total profits generated by the strategy between 10 000 μS and 150 μS latencies 3 .
Strategy's features
Financial engineering is needed when designing a trading algorithm. Table 13 presents on the profitability which is insufficient to cover the infrastructure costs required by the marketmaking activities. Setup 1 relaxes this constraint using the kappa concept defined in Section 3. It does not consider circuit-breakers or closing positions at the end of the day. The profitability of the period reached almost € 2.7 million and the average daily profit was € 21,569. However, the largest daily loss is € 853,324 and the daily volatility is excessively high (€ 235,856) . Moreover, the distribution of profit and loss by transactions is highly leptokurtic. These characteristics are inconsistent with those expected from a market-maker (Brogaard et al. (2016) ). Setup 2 adds the circuit-breakers. Table 13 Impact from strategy's features
----------insert ----------
It results in a substantial increase in profitability (to € 3.2 million). The maximum daily loss, volatility and distribution of PnL per transaction still do not match the behavior of a market-maker.
Setup 3 requires the closing of positions at the end of the day without the inclusion of circuit breakers. Total profits are € 1.4 million and significant changes have occurred in risk features. The maximum daily loss drops to € 3,488 and volatility to € 5,260. Setup 4 which includes kappa, circuit-breakers and EOD liquidations is the proposed trading strategy from Section 3. Profitability exceeds € 2.7 million, no daily loss is incurred, and the distribution of the PnL fits a market maker's behavior. Results are qualitatively the same when analyzing the thirty components of the MDAX.
Conclusion
We have implemented the optimal quoting policy of liquidity provision of Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2014) without the assumption of valuable private information. Profits in both DAX and MDAX over the six-month period exhibit an upward trend without significant drawdowns. The OQP allows the HFMM to extract a constant annuity from the market. However, total profits are insufficient to maintain the infrastructure required by market-making activities.
We have embedded the OQP in a trading strategy. The trading strategy avoids data mining and data snooping. It considers latency and partial executions of limit and market orders. Special care has been taken to eliminate the price impact linked to the HFMM's trading and quoting activities.
Circuit-breakers have been implemented in response to regulators' concerns.
The viability of the strategy has been established using an extensive dataset including sixty stocks in two market segments. It covers a six-month period where the market has encompassed drastically different phases. The strategy exhibits outstanding characteristics when risk and profitability are considered. Market-making activities in both indexes led to 3.45 million € in profit for the six-month period. This is realized through 1.5 million trades, and no daily loss is incurred for either of the indexes. These results are the lower bound of the potential HFMM's performance considering: 1) the worst case scenario applied to his time priority, 2) the way partial executions are handled (loss of time priority, delay to cancel and re-enter quotes), 3) the constraint to incur market risk when using market orders implying quantities exceeding the available ones at level 1, 4) no informational advantage, 5) no maker-fee revenues, and 6) no valuable private information.
We have disentangled the liquidity-providing role from liquidity-consuming activities. Whereas the core of the profits comes from quoting activities, the implementation of circuit breakers adds to total profits. Avoiding overnight positions focuses the appraisal on market-making instead of on directional trading.
Ultrafast extreme events have been documented; they occur regularly. They are linked to idiosyncratic characteristics and do not exhibit systematic behavior. In a context where price impact minimization is a major concern for traders, the prevalence of UEEs deserves further research. These high-frequency events could be associated with elusive liquidity, predatory behaviors, algorithm glitches, and aggregation of information.
Because partial executions of orders (limit and market) are possible, we have proposed a methodology to determine the returns that simultaneously take into consideration the varying Price movements are classified into "up" (+), "unchanged" (0), and "down" (-). Price moves are represented by x,y where x is the i th-1 move and y the i th move. % is the relative occurrence of the column's price movement. Type: 1 = HFMM new limit order, 2 = HFMM limit order cancellation, 3 = incoming LFT market order executed against an HFMM limit order; Time stamps are in microseconds; q = order quantity; id: internal reference to algorithm activity; pos: HFMM position, negative values representing short positions. 
